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Abstract
In this response to commentators, I agree with those who suggested that the distinction 
between exemplar- and abstraction-based accounts is something of a false dichotomy 
and therefore move to an abstractions-made-of-exemplars account under which (a) 
we store all the exemplars that we hear (subject to attention, decay, interference, 
etc.) but (b) in the service of language use, re-represent these exemplars at multiple 
levels of abstraction, as simulated by computational neural-network models such as 
BERT, ELMo and GPT-3. Whilst I maintain that traditional linguistic abstractions (e.g. 
a DETERMINER category; SUBJECT VERB OBJECT word order) are no more than 
human-readable approximations of the type of abstractions formed by both human 
and artificial multiple-layer networks, I express hope that the abstractions-made-of-
exemplars position can point the way towards a truce in the language acquisition wars: 
We were all right all along, just focusing on different levels of abstraction.
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I can’t mean that, can I?
Pretty much! Let me explain. . . In the Before Times (I’m writing this under coronavirus 
lockdown) I wrote a target article (Ambridge, 2020) arguing that (a) we store every indi-
vidual utterance that we hear, along with its understood meaning and contextual details, 
and (b) we do not store linguistic abstractions: apparent stored abstractions – such as those 
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commonly posited to account for [SUBJECT] [VERB] [OBJECT] word order in English 
– are instead generated on the fly by analogizing across stored exemplars. Commentators 
wrote 18 replies – for which I am very grateful – many of them pointing out that the dis-
tinction between exemplar- and abstraction-based accounts is something of a false dichot-
omy (Demuth & Johnson, 2020; Finley, 2020; Lieven et al., 2020; McClelland, 2020; 
Mahowald et al., 2020; Rose, 2020; Schuler et al., 2020) And, do you know what? I was 
wrong and they were right. Of course, I don’t agree with every detail. In particular, many 
of the phenomena raised by the commentators as evidence for stored abstractions strike 
me as equally compatible with stored abstractions and the on-the-fly abstractions that I 
argued for in the original target article. But let’s not split hairs, since the whole point of 
the modified account that I sketch here is to collapse the exemplar–abstraction 
distinction.
The gist of this modified account is that, yes, we store all the exemplars that we hear 
(subject to attention, decay, interference, etc.), but that – in the service of language use 
– these exemplars are re-represented in such a way as to constitute abstractions (hence 
‘Abstractions made of exemplars’; see also Lieven et al.’s [2020] claim that ‘children 
generalise at multiple levels of granularity’). As we will see in more detail shortly, a use-
ful metaphor for this account is a multiple-level connectionist neural network that stores 
every exemplar, re-representing it in increasingly abstract ways as we move up the hid-
den layers (see also Blevins et al., 2018; and Li et al., 2007, as discussed by MacWhinney, 
2020). Crucially, however, my claim is that this is not just a metaphor (Dennett, 2017; 
Hasson et al., 2020; Martin, 2020). The brain really does contain multiple layers of units 
(i.e. neurons), each of which aggregates input signals using a nonlinear function and 
outputs signals to other units. While any particular artificial neural network model of 
language is only the clumsiest metaphor, the claim that language is represented as pat-
terns of activation across ‘dumb’ neurons, each of which ‘knows’ nothing about nouns, 
verbs and all the rest of it is literally true, and quite beyond dispute.1
Why the change of heart? Well, as several commentators (and journal reviewers) 
pointed out, my original target article – despite its title – provided much stronger evi-
dence for stored exemplars than against stored abstractions. My argument against stored 
abstractions was essentially parsimony (if we have all the exemplars needed to generate 
abstractions on the fly, why do we need stored abstractions too?) plus the impossibility 
of positing abstractions that capture all of the data (e.g. both John feared Bill and John 
frightened Bill in the case of the English SVO transitive construction). But the point I 
was overlooking was this: if we store abstractions at multiple levels simultaneously, it 
doesn’t matter if the highest-level abstractions don’t explain every case; exemplars and 
lower-level abstractions are there to take up the slack.
A happy outcome of this abstractions-made-of-exemplars position is that it points the 
way towards a truce – or at least an armistice – in the language acquisition wars. We 
were all right all along, just focusing on different levels of abstraction. Chomskyans 
were impressed by speakers’ abstractions at the highest levels – phrases, heads, comple-
ments and so on – dismissing low-level abstractions as ‘just usage’. Advocates of 
chunk-based learning were impressed by speakers’ abstractions at the lowest levels – 
individual n-grams like What’s+that? and cup+of+tea – dismissing the highest-level 
abstractions as mere descriptive fictions with no psychological reality. Constructivists 
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were impressed by speakers’ abstractions at the middle levels – by constructions like 
[AGENT] [VERB] [RECIPIENT] [THEME] – more abstract than mere lexical strings, 
but less abstract than phrases, heads and complements. We were all right. And yet, at the 
same time, all wrong: while the abstractions posited under the abstractions-made-of-
exemplars account look something like phrases, lexical strings, argument-structure con-
structions and so on – and can be usefully summarized as such to a first approximation 
– they are in fact none of these things.
Can you tell me how to get, how to get to. . . abstract 
representations?
What are they? It’s complicated, and I will try my best to explain below. But the whole 
point of this account is that the abstractions posited eschew verbal explanations. In fact, 
I would go so far as to say that demanding verbal explanations is where we have all been 
going wrong all of these years. For any system as complicated as language, it is naïve to 
expect an explanation couched in terms of ‘human-readable’ concepts like [NOUN] or 
[DATIVE CONSTRUCTION] to be anything more than a broad-brush sketch that should 
not be taken literally. To see why, let’s use an analogy from a domain that is much closer 
than language to being ‘solved’: image classification (McClelland, 2020). Show a multi-
level neural network model a picture, and it will tell you whether it’s a cat, a dog or a 
house. How does it work? Well, if you insist on an explanation in terms of ‘human-
readable’ concepts like ‘nose’, ‘tail’ and ‘window’ you can have one. But you know full 
well that this explanation is just a dumbed-down approximation generated to give 
humans some vague sense of how the system works. How does it actually work? The 
point is, nobody really knows; at least, not if you define ‘knows’ as ‘able to give an 
explanation in terms of human-readable concepts’. The bottom-level, least-abstract layer 
represents the pixels of the image. As we move up through the layers, the representations 
become increasingly more abstract. If we plot the activation patterns of these more 
abstract layers and squint a bit, maybe we can just about make out something that looks 
sort of like a ‘nose detector’. But we know full well that it isn’t really one, and that any 
explanation couched in such simplistic terms is doomed to failure. Sorry, my fellow 
(psycho-/developmental-)linguists, but language is exactly the same.
We’ll come back to language in a minute, I promise, but let’s stick with image clas-
sification for just a moment longer because it nicely illustrates my central claim that 
multiple-layer neural networks – whether artificial or biological ones – are capable of 
storing both abstractions and a huge amount of exemplar-level information.2 Until rela-
tively recently, it was believed that image classification models succeeded only by form-
ing abstractions that capture elements of many different exemplars (like our ‘nose 
detector’). But Zhang et al. (2017) showed that an image-classification model can 
achieve perfect performance on the training set if the category labels are randomized, or 
even if each of the images is replaced by random pixels. Further evidence that my origi-
nal dichotomy between exemplars and abstractions was misguided comes from Kelly 
et al. (2017), who showed that MINERVA 2 – a classic exemplar model – is mathemati-
cally equivalent to a particular type of distributed (‘abstractions’) model (a fourth order 
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tensor). As Demuth and Johnson (2020) rightly pointed out, ‘feature-based approaches 
and exemplar-based approaches to learning are often formally equivalent’.
So now on to language, and with it the commentary by Mahowald et al. (2020). It 
should be clear by now that I wholeheartedly endorse their claim that ‘there need not be 
a hard split between models that encode abstract structures and those that store a huge 
amount of information about the input and allow for fast analogical comparisons’. 
Indeed, this commentary – along with McClelland’s (2020) and Schuler et al.’s (2020) 
– is what inspired my conversion. As these commentators point out, models like BERT 
(Devlin et al., 2018), ELMo (Peters et al., 2018) and GPT-2 (and, hot off the presses, 
GPT-3; Brown et al., 2020)3 are capable of implicitly forming approximations to tradi-
tional ‘syntactic categories’ – and indeed of showing syntactic priming effects – while at 
the same time retaining the item-level information that governs the appropriate use of 
individual idiosyncratic members of these categories.
Of course, there is much to dislike about BERT and its ilk, primarily the fact that it 
lacks not only any kind of communicative goals, but any links to real-world meanings at 
all (Bender & Koller, 2020): Words are represented as vectors that capture their distribu-
tional similarity to other words (a kind of souped-up Latent Semantic Analysis), albeit in 
a context-dependent fashion (e.g. table would have different vectors in the input string 
He sat at the table and See Table 1 for details). And – let me be explicit – for this reason 
I am certainly not advocating BERT, or any other current model, as a feasible model of 
human language acquisition and representation. Until someone figures out how to imple-
ment communicative goals, discourse pragmatics, real-world meanings4 and auditory 
rather than text-based representations – to name but a few – we’re not even close. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, BERT’s task – predicting the masked word 
in an input sentence – is nothing like the task facing human language learners; broadly 
speaking, to understand and to be understood. What I am advocating is the general archi-
tecture and approach; re-representing exemplars in a way that yields abstractions, while 
at the same time retaining a huge amount of exemplar-specific information. Just like 
human learners, BERT doesn’t follow the traditional linguistic approach of positing only 
the most abstract representations possible; rather, it forms multiple abstractions at differ-
ent grain sizes as a by-product of attempting to maximize its performance on some task.5 
(In this sense, it is the ultimate ‘usage-based’ model, although its usage goals are very 
different to those of humans.) As a multiple-layer network of units that re-represents 
linguistic input in increasingly abstract ways in the service of some goal, BERT allows 
us to think about language learning and representation in a way that goes far beyond 
paper-and-pencil linguistic theorizing and, at least in terms of its architecture, enjoys a 
degree of neurobiological plausibility.
While changing one’s position is nothing to be ashamed of – we academics should try 
it more often – there is a sense in which it is rather unfair to commentators who were, of 
course, arguing with my old position, and not my new one. In the remainder of this 
response, as I revisit the domains covered in the original target article, I therefore con-
sider the implications of each commentary not only for an abstractions-made-of-exem-
plars account, but for the pure radical exemplar account I originally advocated.6
But first, let me address the questions raised by Lieven et al. (2020) and Zettersten 
et al. (2020): What empirical findings would support and – most crucially – falsify my 
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current position? After all, if I’m now allowing for abstractions as well as exemplars, 
isn’t any pattern of findings consistent with my position?
In fact, I don’t think so. Although (contra Zettersten et al., 2020) I don’t believe in 
falsification per se, even this new version of the account makes a testable prediction that 
could yield serious probabilistic Bayesian evidence against it. The prediction is this: If 
you probe speakers’ linguistic knowledge in any domain, and if you use a sensitive 
enough test, you will always find the fingerprints of the original exemplars; any abstrac-
tions formed will never efface these exemplars completely. The most straightforward – 
but by no means only – ‘fingerprints’ are effects of surface frequency (see Ambridge 
et al., 2015, for other possibilities). For example, the account predicts that long after 
children become capable of applying English past tense -ed inflection in a wug test 
(Berko, 1958) – and, indeed, throughout their entire lifespan – they will produce quicker 
and more accurate responses for frequently witnessed forms, or for novel forms that are 
similar to them (e.g. Ambridge, 2010; Blything et al., 2017). For two more examples, see 
the experiments suggested by Hou and Morford (2020). Of course, proving a negative is 
impossible, which is why I don’t like to talk about absolute falsification. But repeatedly 
finding evidence for a null effect (e.g. using Bayes Factors or frequentist equivalence 
testing), using a measure that is sensitive enough to detect observed effects in similar 
domains with the given sample size, would eventually constitute sufficient evidence to 
reject this proposal. This evidence would be particularly powerful if it were accompanied 
by effects of frequency (or whatever) at the level of the putative abstraction; a pattern 
that would constitute evidence that we store the abstraction, but not the exemplars.
Word meanings
I was surprised to see that not one of the commentators took issue with the central claim 
of this section of the original target article: that word meanings are structured as exem-
plars, rather than as prototype categories based around a central meaning. The reason I 
found this surprising is that the prototype view seems to me to be fairly well entrenched 
in the literature. This view is explicit in statements such as ‘home clearly has a prototypi-
cal meaning that can be extended to highlight a particular attribute (or attributes) of the 
prototypical meaning’ (Goldberg, 2006, p. 169). It is implicit in a tremendous number of 
experimental studies of word-learning in which children must learn that a number of 
concrete objects with carefully controlled variations along – usually – a single feature are 
all instances of a dax. (I have yet to encounter a study in which children must also learn 
that entirely dissimilar concrete objects are also daxes, as are pictures of daxes, actions 
that are only abstractly related to the concrete objects, and so on; see my original discus-
sion of the word table.)
So I don’t think (contra Knabe & Vlach, 2020) that I was making a strawman argu-
ment. My perception of the word-learning literature (albeit as an outsider) is that the 
prototype view is the mainstream, textbook, ‘common-sense’ view, with the anti-repre-
sentationalist positions adopted by researchers such as Linda Smith and Larissa 
Samuelson generally considered to be too radical. But I hope I’m wrong, as I’m basi-
cally in agreement with their position. Indeed, a number of studies conducted by these 
researchers (see Smith & Samuelson, 2006, for a commentary; see also Brooks & 
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Kempe, 2020) suggest that children’s shape-bias effects need not be ‘attributed to con-
cepts as unitary representational entities’ (p. 1342), calling into question the claim of 
Naigles (2020) that shape-bias effects can be used to draw conclusions regarding 
abstract categories.
Potentially problematic for my position are the findings discussed by Zettersten et al. 
(2020) showing that participants (a) rapidly generalize at superordinate levels (e.g. vehi-
cle), (b) ‘are more likely to ascribe a shared property (e.g., gills) to perceptually-dissim-
ilar animals in the same biological category (e.g., sharks and tropical fish) than to 
perceptually-similar animals in different biological categories (e.g., sharks and dolphins) 
and (c) struggle with categorization rules that are complex or hard to verbalize. However, 
I am not entirely persuaded by these findings, given that they relate to categorization 
problems that seem to rely on fairly explicit verbalizable knowledge (e.g. that, despite 
their appearance, dolphins are mammals, not fish), rather than to naturalistic word-learn-
ing in young children (see also Brooks & Kempe, 2020 on the issue of explicitness).
None of this is to say that I reject the idea of word- and concept-level abstractions 
entirely, as I did in my original target article. The abstractions-made-of-exemplars posi-
tion holds that individual word+meaning pairs are re-represented in increasingly abstract 
ways as we move up through the levels of the network. In some cases, at some levels, 
these representations may correspond very approximately to traditional prototype word 
meaning categories; but only in the sense that our image classification network can be 
said very approximately to have a ‘nose detector’. Indeed, although they lack any real 
representation of word meanings, multi-layer neural network models such as BERT 
already work in something like this fashion. BERT’s use of context-dependent vectors 
means that, initially, a word such as table will be represented by very different vectors in 
phrases such as dining table, see Table 1 for details, league table and water table. The 
model will form abstractions across distinct uses of table only when doing so aids it in 
its masked-word-prediction task.
Morphologically inflected words
With a couple of minor exceptions, nobody attempted to challenge my exemplar view of 
morphology. Of course, this may simply be because many of the commentators’ primary 
interests lie elsewhere. I would like to think, however, that at least part of the reason for 
this omission is that the probabilistic frequency and phonological neighbourhood density 
effects that have been observed in this domain, and that are well simulated by exemplar 
models, are extremely difficult to explain under non-exemplar accounts. Hartshorne 
(2020) notes that symbolic ‘models of morphology have pushed beyond ‘single default 
rule’ paradigms to employ myriad productive rules (O’Donnell, 2015)’, but the model 
that he cites does not – as do the exemplar models I originally cited – make graded pre-
dictions regarding the acceptability of various past tense forms of novel verbs on the 
basis of their phonology; indeed, ‘no phonological . . . structure is represented’ at all 
(O’Donnell, 2015, p. 146).
MacWhinney (2020) is correct to point out that most of the exemplar models I cited in 
the target article lack a temporal dimension and so cannot simulate U-shaped learning in 
this domain (e.g. went→goed→went). However, this strikes me as a purely 
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implementational problem, since exemplar models are well placed to trade off effects of 
rote storage and analogy, both of which are their bread and butter (see for example the 
discriminative learning model of Ramscar et al. [2013], which in effect constitutes an 
exemplar model with a temporal element). Certainly, some production front-end would 
have to be added to simulate MacWhinney’s horserace phenomenon (e.g. ‘runned, uh 
ran’), but I see no reason why this would undermine the overall spirit of an 
exemplar+analogy model.
To my knowledge, nobody has yet attempted to extend exemplar models of the 
English past tense using a BERT-like architecture (the Kirov & Cotterell [2018] model 
cited in the original target article has some similarities, but has only two layers). Indeed, 
this relatively simple paradigm may not require such elaborate architecture. In principle, 
though, a BERT-type model is well placed to simulate acquisition of complex paradigms 
of inflectional morphology (such as the Polish verb system, modelled by Engelmann 
et al. [2019], using a connectionist network, though with only a hidden single layer). 
Because a BERT-type model posits commonalities only when doing so improves perfor-
mance on its task (e.g. producing the requested person+number-marked present tense 
form given a verb stem), it retains the ability to maintain separate representations for 
infrequent or even entirely idiosyncratic mappings. At the same time, the abstract repre-
sentations in the highest layers allow it to generalize to novel forms.
N-grams
Often, what commentators don’t say is as informative as what they do. By my reckoning, 
just under half of the commentators seem to be of the view that our knowledge of lan-
guage is best represented in terms of traditional high-level abstract categories with little 
verbatim storage of exemplars. Yet none of these commentators offered a suggestion of 
how such a model could explain our detailed knowledge of n-gram statistics. Why not? 
In my view, the answer is that such an explanation is close to impossible by definition. If 
we know (to borrow an example from Yang, 2013) that ‘the bathroom is more frequent 
than a bathroom’ – and my target article cited considerable evidence that we do – we 
must, in some form or other, be storing these exemplars. If we throw them out entirely in 
favour of a DET+NOUN rule, there is simply no way to account for this detailed knowl-
edge. Notably, the only commentary that addressed the issue of n-gram storage, Hou and 
Morford (2020), did so to extend the already-abundant evidence for chunking to signed 
languages, noting – as I did for spoken languages – the difficulty of accounting for such 
phenomena under accounts based solely on traditional high-level abstractions.
Sentence-level constructions (syntax)
Before considering some of the points raised by commentators in the domain of sen-
tence-level syntax, I think it’s valuable to once again point out what they did not say. In 
my target article, I spent six pages setting out why the notion of as-abstract-as-possible 
syntactic representations of (English) SUBJECT VERB OBJECT word order are both 
problematic in principle and difficult to reconcile with a great deal of data from experi-
mental studies (mainly) with children. Yet none of the commentators who would 
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presumably advocate something like this notion provided any direct arguments against 
my claims, preferring – on the whole – to open up completely new lines of attack. Fair 
enough, maybe this isn’t the time or place. But at some point, theorists of the view that 
speakers maintain only highly abstract representations of SVO word order (who can be 
found on both sides of the familiar generativist-constructivist divide) owe the field an 
answer to the question of how to reconcile their view with these findings. Notably, the 
only commentator who engaged directly with this issue, Chandler (2020), did so only to 
provide yet more evidence of exemplar storage at this level.
Adger (2020) asks how a radical exemplar model (REM) learner could learn that 
Anson kept the picture in the shed is ambiguous in a way that Which shed did Anson keep 
the picture in? is not. In one sense, Adger and I are starting from such different assump-
tions that it makes debate almost impossible. The key to his argument is that speakers 
learn to form questions by hearing declarative-question pairs such as Jill liked the pic-
ture. ~ Which picture did Jill like? and thus that when the declarative-question relation-
ship in such pairs is analogized to the declarative Anson kept the picture in the shed to 
yield a question, it will bring along its baggage, in the form of its ambiguity. But his 
starting assumptions that speakers (a) learn questions from question+declarative pairs 
and thus (b) generate questions from corresponding declaratives are anathema not just to 
a radical exemplar model but to all usage-based accounts of question formation and 
acquisition (e.g. Ambridge & Rowland, 2009; Ambridge et al., 2006).
Yet, in another sense, Adger (2020) and I are almost in agreement. His broader point is 
that strings such as the picture (that was) in the shed and my neighbour’s cat’s tail can be 
used and understood correctly only if they are analysed as ‘similar in abstract structure but 
different in surface form’: i.e. as instances of something like a NOUN (or DETERMINER) 
PHRASE. I agree completely. As Demuth and Johnson (2020) put it, language-learning 
mechanisms ‘will have to involve linguistic abstractions such as . . . syntactic phrases’. Of 
course. The only point of disagreement is where linguistic abstractions such as syntactic 
phrases come from. Is NOUN PHRASE a structure we’re born with (which I take to be 
Adger’s position), or one that emerges, in approximate form, either during on-the-fly anal-
ogy (my position in the original target article) or during increasingly abstract re-representa-
tion in a multiple-layer network pursuing some goal (my current position)? The latter options 
are on the table because nobody ever said that analogy operates solely on the basis of surface 
form. There is much else to go on. For example, My neighbour, My neighbour’s cat, My 
neighbour’s cat’s tail and so on are similar in that they are potential (abstract) possessors,7 
and all are similar to the picture that was in the shed in that they are entities that can serve as 
topics, that can have properties attributed to them (‘is huge’), and so on. Different in surface 
form, but similar in abstract (semantic, [discourse-]functional) structure.
For evidence that some approximation of a NOUN PHRASE can emerge during 
increasingly abstract re-representation in a multiple-layer network pursuing some goal, 
we need only try out a couple of sentences in BERT8 (which, unlike human learners, is 
hobbled by a reliance on surface forms; albeit a lot of them).
(1) The picture in the shed [MASK] old
(2) The pictures in the shed [MASK] old
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For (1), BERT predicts is with considerably greater probability than are (log probabil-
ities −3.00 vs −11.48). For (2) BERT predicts are with considerably greater probability 
than is (−2.62 vs −9.29). The fact that BERT is not misled by the local bigram shed+is 
indicates that, while it does not have a NOUN PHRASE in so many words (remember 
our ‘nose detector’), it has built some kind of abstract representation that effectively 
functions as one in this context (see Bernardy & Lappin, 2017; Linzen et al., 2016 for 
more systematic investigations).
If all three possibilities – innate NOUN PHRASE, on-the-fly approximation and 
BERT-style approximation – end up in more or less the same place, why should we dis-
count the first option? Because if we retain only the abstraction, there is no way to 
account for the wealth of lower-level information that we in fact retain (e.g. that ‘cat . . . 
can usually be preceded by an article’ [Adger, 2020], but not by ‘some’, unless it is being 
served as a foodstuff; that the+bathroom is more frequent than a+bathroom, cup+of+tea 
than cup+of+milk, and so on).
I realize I’ve just spent a disproportionate chunk of my word allowance on a single 
commentary, but the investment is about to pay off, because the arguments I’ve just set 
out apply to all of the commentaries that apparently (to me at least) view syntax as 
dependent on stored, as-abstract-as-possible representations. For example, I certainly 
did not, as Hartshorne (2020) suggests, mean to imply, that speakers ‘treat each utter-
ance–meaning pair as its own exemplar, with no internal structure’; the meaning/func-
tion part of the pair gives the utterance internal structure (e.g. uniting the picture that 
was in the shed and My neighbour’s cat as entities that can have properties attributed 
to them and so on). Similarly, phrases such as pet vampire are interpreted not by anal-
ogy with individual exemplars of pet and vampires, but with attributive noun phrases 
like tomato soup. Again, the meaning/function part of the pair – here something like 
[TYPE/PROPERTY][THING] – is what gives these utterances internal structure. Yet, 
again, we agree more than we disagree: yes, it is indeed ‘difficult to imagine cognition 
without abstractions’; and, yes, they confer ‘many blessings’. The point is that by hav-
ing these abstractions emerge in the moment (as in the original target article) or as a 
by-product of re-representing exemplars in the service of some task (my current view) 
we can enjoy all the benefits of stored high-level abstractions (e.g. approximations of 
the SVO construction, NOUN PHRASE) with none of the costs that we incur if we 
posit only these abstractions (i.e. the failure to account for low-level lexical knowledge 
such as n-gram frequency).
I offer an almost identical rebuttal to Koring et al. (2020). It is absolutely not ‘reason-
able to expect a model of stored exemplars to assign the same meanings to the same 
strings of words’ since – as I originally argued – ‘learners store concrete exemplars, each 
including the surface form along with its understood meaning and contextual details’. A 
string of words such as ‘Yeah, it was great!’ can have understood meanings that are 
entirely opposite, given the contextual details (e.g. as responses to ‘Did you enjoy your 
vacation?’ [literal meaning] vs ‘Did you enjoy your algebra exam?’ [sarcasm]). Thus, the 
whole point of the exemplar approach is that each and every instance of a particular 
string (e.g. the parents expected to like each other) will be stored with slightly different 
understood meanings and contextual details. The same can be said for Koring et al.’s 
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(2020) other examples: the fact that dis- and not have similar interpretations in some 
contexts and dissimilar interpretations in others is a problem for a formalist model that 
attempts to shoehorn both into an abstract category of negation; not for an exemplar 
model that records every understood meaning and all contextual details for every dis- or 
not sentence it encounters. The fact that we say did+not+agree+at+all but 
disagree+completely is easily captured by even the simplest n-gram learner. Indeed, the 
native-speaker institution that disagree+completely is more common than 
disagree+entirely than disagree+greatly and so on is trivial for BERT,
(3) I have to say that I disagree [MASK].
completely (−1.77) > entirely (−3.25), greatly (−3.78), altogether (−3.93), absolutely (−4.38)
but a complete mystery for the ‘formalist’ models advocated by Koring et al. (2020).
Similarly, I agree with Messenger et al. (2020) that syntactic priming relies on some 
form of abstract syntactic structure (though I find it odd that they cite Bock [1989] and 
Bock & Loebell [1990] as evidence that ‘priming occurs in the absence of lexical or the-
matic overlap’ without challenging my claim in the target article that the findings of Ziegler 
& Snedeker [2018] and Ziegler et al. [2018], suggest otherwise; likewise, for counterevi-
dence to Messenger et al., 2012; see Bidgood et al., in press). But, again, I see no advan-
tage – and considerable disadvantage in terms of explaining low-level lexical effects – in 
assuming that this abstract syntactic structure is stored – and stored at only the most 
abstract level possible – as opposed to emergent (a) on the fly or (b) as a by-product of 
re-representing exemplars in the service of some task. Certainly, as Mahowald et al. 
(2020) point out, BERT-type models can simulate syntactic priming effects with only 
emergent knowledge of abstract syntactic structures. Crosslinguistic syntactic priming 
effects are, in effect, simulated by BERT’s cousin Google Translate, which – when given 
an input sentence – produces an output sentence with corresponding syntax but different 
lexical items; the very definition of syntactic priming. This is easily demonstrated by, for 
example, entering English stimuli from Hartsuiker et al.’s (2004) seminal English–Spanish 
priming study, and inspecting the translations, which recapitulate the English syntax:
(4) The taxi chases the truck → El taxi persigue el camión
(5) The truck is chased by the taxi → El camión es perseguido por el taxi.
Nor am I persuaded by Messenger et al.’s (2020) argument that findings from amnesia 
patients ‘are not well-explained by an exemplar model in which syntax generation is pri-
marily influenced by the retrieval of exemplars, stored within declarative memory’, given 
that I specifically advocated an exemplar model that ‘blurs these [declarative/procedural, 
explicit/implicit] distinctions’ (as, of course, do BERT-type models). I am, on the other 
hand, happy to concede that error-based (reverse-frequency) and timespan effects are not 
simulated by the kinds of exemplar models I originally discussed, which are mainly 
‘static’ models without a time-course element. That said, I see nothing in principle that 
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prohibits exemplar models from adopting architectures that yield such effects; indeed, the 
BERT-type models that I advocate here use a form of error-based learning.
Naigles (2020) reports findings that children with ASD show correlations between 
their performance on early tasks measuring speed of processing SVO sentences and (1) 
later syntactic-bootstrapping tasks with very different SVO sentences and (2) later wh-
question comprehension. Again, I would agree that the former finding requires some 
kind of appeal to abstract syntax, in that children’s abilities with SVO at Time 1 are car-
ried forward into Time 2. But, again, I see no reason to favour the version in which this 
abstract syntax takes the form of a stored SVO transitive construction at the most abstract 
level possible, as opposed to an approximation of an SVO transitive construction (and 
many less abstract sub-regularities) emergent (a) on the fly or (b) in BERT-style re-rep-
resentation. Again, only the latter two options are compatible with the lexically restricted 
nature of young children’s SVO transitive utterances as shown – for example – in the 19 
production studies that I cited as evidence of an input-based advantage for pronoun-
based over full-NP-based SVO transitives. The second finding, of correlations between 
performance on SVO transitives and wh-questions – and between each of these measures 
and vocabulary – is entirely expected under an account in which all rely on the same 
underlying ability of analogy (again, whether those analogies are conducted on the fly, or 
during BERT-style re-representation).
Phonetics and phonology
The arguments that I rehearsed in the previous section apply here too. Although many 
commentators pointed out the necessity of phonological abstractions, in general I strug-
gled to understand the necessity of these abstractions being stored, rather than generated 
on the fly (of course, as Rose [2020] points out, ‘blanket rejection of abstract categories 
seems preposterous at best’, which is why the original target article advocated only the 
rejection of stored abstractions). Fortunately, mainstream phoneticians and phonologists 
– on the whole, unlike syntacticians and morphologists – have preempted my belated 
conversion to a BERT-style model under which we both store individual exemplars and 
re-represent them into increasingly abstract representations that approximate – if only 
imperfectly – traditional categories. Indeed, although I would hardly describe myself as a 
fan of Optimality Theory in general, the ‘multiple levels of abstraction’ approach set out 
by Finley (2020) comes very close to the ‘BERT-for-phonology’ model that I would now 
advocate, as do the ‘emergentist approaches to the development of increasingly abstract 
layers of categories based on the learner’s past experiences’ set out by Rose (2020).
The great strength of this approach is that, as I noted in the Introduction, it avoids 
positing a false dichotomy between ‘feature-based approaches and exemplar-based 
approaches to learning [which] are often formally equivalent’ (Demuth & Johnson, 2020; 
Kelly et al., 2017). In so doing, it retains all the advantages of exemplar approaches that 
I originally cited – retaining fine-grained information regarding speaker identity, socio-
linguistic variation and so on – and acknowledges the fact that actual speech is far 
removed from the idealization of a sequence of phonemes drawn from a discrete inven-
tory. It also retains all the advantages of abstraction-based approaches summarized by 
numerous commentators (see also McQueen et al., 2006; Turk & Shattuck-Hufnagel, 
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2020): we adapt quickly to unfamiliar accents (Hartshorne, 2020; MacWhinney, 2020; 
Schuler et al., 2020); infants in their first year generalize at the phonemic level, rapidly 
learning to ignore distinctions that are not relevant in the target language (Demuth & 
Johnson, 2020; Lieven et al., 2020; Zettersten et al., 2020); abstract phonotactic knowl-
edge is necessary for word segmentation (Demuth & Johnson, 2020); although some 
fine-grained phonetic detail9 of individual speakers is retained, much is lost (Schuler 
et al., 2020); orthographic representations are linked to idealized auditory representa-
tions of words rather than particular exemplars (Brooks & Kempe, 2020); speakers have 
intuitions about the relative acceptability of different consonant clusters, even if their 
language allows neither (Finley, 2020); learners’ substitution patterns are not specific to 
individual word forms, but to segmental categories (Rose, 2020). In conclusion, in their 
widespread adoption of multiple-levels-of-abstraction accounts, developmental phonol-
ogists and phoneticians have shown us developmental syntacticians and morphologists a 
path that we would be wise to follow.
Bringing it all together
Before summing up, let me touch briefly – I promise – on a few important issues raised 
by the commentators that transcend the individual domains reviewed above.
Only a single commentary – Schuler et al. (2020) – directly addressed the neurologi-
cal plausibility, or otherwise, of a radical exemplar model. I must admit that I lack the 
expertise needed to evaluate the findings raised by these commentators, but I am happy 
to take them on face value as evidence against my original radical exemplar model and 
in favour of a BERT-style model that represents both exemplars and abstractions at dif-
ferent neural levels.
Brooks and Kempe (2020) raise the issue of how explicit knowledge should be incor-
porated into an exemplar model. I’m sure explicit knowledge, particularly literacy, plays 
an important role, but I really have no idea how to account for it, other than to kick the 
can down the road: presumably, explicit knowledge, and certainly literacy, does not 
become an important factor until after the first few years of language acquisition, mean-
ing those of us who are interested primarily in basic morphosyntax can largely afford not 
to worry about it. Later on, however, I’m sure Brooks and Kempe (2020) are entirely 
correct to point out that episodes of memory retrieval themselves create a memory trace. 
More generally, it is certainly the case that, as MacWhinney (2020) points out, the out-
puts of analogy need to be able to serve as the inputs to other analogies (including, for 
example, for possessive ’s recursion; see note 7). Indeed, it would be unprincipled for an 
account that assumes that we store all the utterance–meaning pairs that we hear to make 
an exception for those that we produce ourselves (even if only internally).
Three commentators – Messenger et al. (2020), Knabe and Vlach (2020) and Brooks 
and Kempe (2020) – challenged my dismissal of forgetting-as-abstraction accounts. I 
agree that the issue is dealt with unsatisfactorily by classic exemplar accounts of the 
type I originally advocated, and – like with so much else in this response – see BERT-
type models as the perfect way to bridge the gap. Such models store every exemplar 
(subject to attention, etc.) and do not ‘forget’ in the sense of expunging whole exemplars 
or their subparts. Yet, as Mahowald et al. (2020) point out, ‘Due to various mechanisms 
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commonly used in neural networks such as regularization and incremental weight 
updating, typically not all training instances T are typically retrievable even if the num-
ber of parameters P > T.’ In this respect, they simulate the all-too-human phenomenon 
of forgetting.10 On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that, unlike the single-
layer connectionist models I argued against in the original target article, such models 
nevertheless retain a huge amount of exemplar-level information (Zhang et al., 2017), 
allowing them – in principle – to simulate all of the exemplar-based phenomena I origi-
nally summarized.
The flipside of forgetting – sleep consolidation – was not explicitly raised by any of 
the commentators, but had been playing on my mind ever since the original target arti-
cle. The phenomenon is that learning is most effective when it is distributed amongst 
different sessions with sleep in between (this includes children’s learning of grammati-
cal constructions, as per my very first published study; Ambridge et al., 2006); that is, 
memories formed during the day are somehow consolidated during sleep. This finding 
is difficult to square with a pure exemplar model, but is well simulated by BERT-style 
multiple-layer neural network models (e.g. Golden et al., 2020). Such models consoli-
date memories and avoid catastrophic forgetting (where new learning wipes out the old) 
using a ‘sleep’ period in which, just like in human sleep, patterns of neural firing from 
the pre-sleep period are replayed. It is precisely this period of offline reactivation that 
allows the model to form abstractions that – just like BERT’s linguistic abstractions – 
apply across multiple exemplars.
Quite a few commentators – most explicitly Lieven et al. (2020), McClelland (2020), 
Demuth and Johnson (2020), Schuler et al. (2020) and Hou and Morford (2020) – raised 
the question of how to measure similarity (and whether this changes across time and 
across tasks); including the problems of how to segment the (linguistic and nonlinguis-
tic) world into units over which similarity can be computed, and the extent to which 
different tokens of – at some level – ‘the same’ exemplar are really the same. All I can 
really say in response is that these questions apply equally to all accounts (a) on-the-fly 
analogy, (b) BERT-style abstractions made of exemplars, (c) high-level abstractions built 
from exemplars that are then discarded or (d) traditional linguistic categories with some 
innate basis. In all cases, learners need to know what dimensions are relevant, whether 
they are generalizing across exemplars to form abstract categories of some type, or sim-
ply assigning exemplars to them. Thus, the difficulty of specifying the generalization 
metric does not seem to me to favour one type of account over another.
Where do we go from here?
Pinker (1979, 1987) famously argued that sentences such as
John ate fish
John ate rabbits
John can fish
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‘would seduce a distributional analysis learner into combining heterogenous words . . . 
into a single class, leading to the production of’ (for this example) *John can rabbits, 
‘and other monstrosities’ (Pinker, 1979, p. 240).11 When I first started out in language 
acquisition research, this example was still being widely cited as evidence against the 
possibility of distributional analysis. These days, not so much. Why not? Well, in 1979, 
when distributional analysis was little more than a theoretical possibility, the argument 
was seductive. But as soon as researchers began to implement distributional analysis 
computationally, it turned out that it was not nearly so brittle (e.g. Mintz, 2003). Today, 
even the grammar-checker that is built into Microsoft Word – hardly the state of the art 
– baulks at *John can rabbits.12 Similarly, the question of how children learn to avoid 
errors such as *The clown laughed the man (cf. The clown made the man laugh) while 
maintaining the ability to generalize unseen verbs into this construction has long been 
viewed as a ‘learnability paradox’ (Pinker, 1989, p. 415), and ‘one of the most . . . dif-
ficult challenges for all students of language acquisition’ (Bowerman, 1988, p. 73). But 
once we set aside the theoretical arguments and set out to build a computational model, 
it proved almost trivially simple (Ambridge et al., 2020). The English past tense debate 
– as discussed in the original target article – is a third example.
My point is that the argument ‘It’s impossible to learn X without innate knowledge/
without abstract representations/using analogy’ – or whatever – simply melts away once 
someone builds a computational model that does so. As Hartshorne (2020) puts it, ‘We 
will not know what approach to modeling language acquisition will work until we have 
one that does’ (see also Guest & Martin, 2020). Thus my first conclusion is that, if we are 
to move forward with this debate, we need much more computational modelling. In par-
ticular, we need comparative computational modelling: studies in which computational 
models instantiating the various theoretical approaches that have been advocated in this 
special issue and elsewhere are compared on their ability to closely simulate data from 
human children and adults, when supplied with comparable input.13 After all, it’s easy to 
find fault with any model, since a host of entirely unrealistic simplifying assumptions are 
necessary merely to implement the learning problem. This means it’s not sufficient sim-
ply to find fault with Model X; you need to show that Model Y does a better job of simu-
lating the human data. A difficulty here is that we have just about reached the point where 
building state-of-the-art computational models requires the resources of some of the 
world’s biggest companies. If we mere academics are going to take on the might of 
Google, Uber and Elon Musk, we are going to have to pool our resources into a kind of 
CERN for language acquisition research14 rather than – and I include myself entirely in 
this – tinkering around at the edges.
At the start of this commentary, I expressed the hope that an abstractions-made-of-
exemplars position might point the way to a truce in the language acquisition wars. I 
would therefore like to end with my thoughts on what each side could learn from the 
other. But first, let me reiterate something else I said in the Introduction: concepts like 
phoneme, word, determiner, phrase, construction and so on are useful tools for thinking 
about language, but we should not kid ourselves that they are anything more than that. At 
the biological level, all of these things are no more than approximations of certain pat-
terns of neural activity, and any explanation couched in terms of these human-readable 
concepts is nothing more than a broad-brush sketch.
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Researchers on the usage-based-constructivist side should take more seriously the 
high-level, very abstract generalizations that have been uncovered by researchers on 
the generativist-nativist side. Under an abstractions-made-of-exemplars account, the 
fact that these generalizations often gloss over exceptions and facts of usage does not 
necessarily mean that they are wrong. Often, like the high-level abstractions of a 
BERT-type network, these high-level abstractions may merely need supplementing 
with much lower-level ones, sometimes all the way down to individual exemplar 
tokens. We may even be moving slowly towards a consensus on the vexed issue of 
innate knowledge. My impression – and I must admit, it is little more than that – is that 
generativist-nativist researchers are inching away from the position that categories and 
phrase structure themselves are innately given and towards the position that we are 
innately biased to form linguistic generalizations more readily on the basis of some 
properties than others (say, number than colour). Similarly, my impression is that many 
usage-based-constructivist researchers would have little difficulty in accepting these 
types of innate biases, particularly if they can be tied to some kind of universal hierar-
chy of communicative goals. For example, our model that solved Pinker’s (1989, p. 
415) ‘learnability paradox’ exemplified by *The clown laughed the man (Ambridge 
et al., 2020) was set up in such a way as to form its generalizations on the basis of four 
measures of directness of causation. This was primarily done as an implementational 
convenience, but while we should be wary of evolutionary just-so stories, it would not 
seem particularly implausible for languages to evolve in such a way as to force their 
speakers to mark degrees of causality.
Conversely, researchers on the generativist-nativist side should take more seriously 
the low-level, very specific knowledge that has been uncovered by researchers on the 
usage-based-constructivist side. Under an abstractions-made-of-exemplars account, 
the fact that particular exemplars could in principle be united by higher-level abstrac-
tions does not necessarily mean that only the abstractions are represented, and that 
lower-level representations can be dismissed as learned exceptions or mere facts of 
usage. A satisfactory account of language acquisition, and indeed of adult representa-
tions, needs to account for our knowledge at all levels, from the most to the least 
abstract. Again, the solution may be simply to supplement the high-level abstractions 
with much lower-level ones, sometimes all the way down to individual exemplar 
tokens. And I see nothing in this that is incompatible in principle with the generativist-
nativist position; or, at least, with the more moderate version that posits innate biases 
rather than innate categories.
In summary, we were all right and all wrong. At the descriptive level, language con-
sists of both exemplars and abstractions at many levels of granularity, with different 
theoretical approaches preferring to zoom in on different levels. But at the implementa-
tional level, language consists of none of these things; just layers and layers of neurons.
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Notes
 1. Dupre and Yuste (2017) have already succeeded in decoding the behaviour of Hydra Vulgaris 
in terms of its neural circuits. It goes without saying that human language is considerably 
more complex than the behavioural repertoire of Hydra Vulgaris (essentially elongating and 
contracting), but unless one believes in ‘wonder tissue’ (Dennett, 2017) there is no reason to 
think that language, or any other human behaviour, cannot in principle be understood at this 
level.
 2. As Mahowald et al. point out (see their note 2), ‘typically not all training exemplars are typi-
cally retrieveable’; but, of course, the same is true for human language learners (see the sec-
tion Bringing it all together).
 3. For convenience, I will throughout this response talk about ‘BERT-type models’. I don’t 
intend this to mean just variations of BERT, or even just transformer models, but rather all 
models that use huge numbers of units and hidden layers to abstractly re-represent exemplars 
in the service of some task.
 4. This seems to me to be the biggest stumbling block as it is unclear how it would ever be pos-
sible to add meanings at scale to a model. Even if we had the resources to hand-code every 
utterance, how could we ever agree on the semantic primitives to encode? (Of course, this 
is a problem for any computational model implementing any account of language, not just 
BERT.) For now, we will just have to live with context-dependent vectors as the least bad 
option. After all, while nobody will ever agree on the precise meaning of ‘cat’, we can all 
agree that it’s closer in meaning to ‘kitten’ and ‘dog’ than to ‘democracy’ and ‘whether’.
 5. At least this is one rough-and-ready interpretation of what BERT-type models are doing. 
Exactly what they are doing is unclear (indeed, finding out is an active and fast-moving 
research area), but that’s kind of the point: whatever they are doing is not readily understand-
able in terms of human-readable categories and concepts, and it is a mistake to try to reduce 
them to such.
 6. Of course, I don’t have the space to address each and every specific point made by every com-
mentator – most made three or four separate points that could merit essay-length responses on 
their own – and for that I can only apologize.
 7. For more detail see: www.lucid.ac.uk/news-events-blog/blogs/why-is-language-unlimited 
-david-adger-s-book-s-take-on-possessive-s/
 8. I thank Kyle Mahowald for writing the code that allowed me to experiment with BERT’s 
masked sentence prediction task.
 9. As I neglected to make clear in the original target article, my use of the term ‘phonetic detail’ 
(and indeed of ‘phonetics’ and ‘phonology’) is intended to include signed languages.
10. Interestingly, Khandelwal et al. (2020) and Kassner and Schütze (2020) show that augment-
ing a BERT-type model with exemplars (specifically a k-nearest neighbours model) boosts 
performance, precisely because it allows for storage of infrequent patterns that are other-
wise ‘forgotten’; i.e. erased by ‘mechanisms . . . such as regularization and incremental 
weight updating’ (Mahowald et al., 2020). Since human learners do seem to forget infrequent 
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patterns, the goals of maximizing model performance and simulating human behaviour may 
not be aligned here.
11. ‘. . . The words are coming out all weird.’
12. Word’s autocorrect suggests ‘rabbit’ meaning something like ‘talk incessantly, despite the 
fact that your listener is clearly bored’; a meaning that I suspect is specific to British English 
(apparently from Cockney rhyming slang, ‘rabbit and pork’, ‘talk’; e.g. https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Rabbit_(song)).
13. As Guest and Martin (2020, p. 3) put it, ‘All models are wrong but some are more wrong than 
others (pastiche based on: Box, 1976; Orwell, 1945).’
14. In fact, there already exist several large-scale international collaborations with ambitious 
goals to map and simulate the human brain, such as the United States BRAIN Initiative and 
the European Union Human Brain Project (see Yuste & Bargmann, 2017, for a summary). But 
as far as I could make out, language is barely touched upon in either.
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